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Searching for buried metallic evidence at crime scenes or at potential disposal sites can 
be a daunting task for forensic personnel. In particular, it is common to search for a small firearm 
that was discarded or buried by the perpetrator. When performing forensic searches, it is 
recommended to first use non-invasive methods such as geophysical instruments to minimize 
damage to evidence and to the crime scene. Geophysical tools are used to pinpoint small areas of 
interest across a scene that will be invasively tested later. Prior to this project, there was no 
published research that tested the utility of the conductivity meter to search for metallic weapons 
such as firearms and blunt or sharp edged weapons. A sample comprised of 32 metallic weapons 
was buried in a controlled setting to test the applicability of a conductivity meter for forensic 
searches. Weapons were tested at multiple depths; once data collection was performed for one 
depth, the weapons were reburied 5cm deeper until they were no longer detected. Results 
obtained with conductivity meter were compared to results obtained by the ground-penetrating 
radar using different depths and transect intervals. The effects of several variables on detection 
such as weapon size, metallic composition, burial depth, and transect interval were analyzed in 
order to explore the limitations of each instrument. Results obtained from this controlled research 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 Standard training provided to law enforcement agencies does not typically prepare 
investigators for some of the more complex forensic searches that involve the use of geophysical 
tools (Schultz, 2007; 2008). Searching for buried evidence at crime scenes or at potential 
disposal sites can be a daunting task for law enforcement agencies. Trying to locate a firearm, for 
example, that was disposed of or buried by the perpetrator, can be challenging due to its potential 
small size. Another problem that some law enforcement groups face is a lack of resources to 
purchase high quality equipment for searches. Therefore, most groups utilize low-cost metal 
detectors to search for buried metallic weapons. The highest probability of a successful search 
for buried metallic evidence can be obtained by combining the resources of law enforcement 
with the expertise of a forensic archaeologist with geophysical experience (Schultz, 2007). In 
addition, the forensic archaeologist may be able to provide a variety of tools that may aid in a 
search, depending on the type of buried evidence being searched for and the location of the 
search. 
Search methods can be divided into intrusive and non-intrusive categories (Dupras et al., 
2006; Hunter and Cox, 2005; Killam, 2004; Nickell and Fischer, 1999). Extreme caution must be 
taken when using intrusive or destructive instruments during a search, especially if the handler 
has relatively little experience, as they can damage important evidence located beneath the 
ground. These instruments include probes, shovels, and the forensic backhoe. Non-intrusive 
techniques are methods that do not damage evidence during a search and include geophysical 
technologies such as ground-penetrating radar (GPR), metal detectors, magnetic locators, 
resistivity meters, magnetometers, and conductivity meters (Dupras et al., 2006). These tools can 
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be ideal for searches as they ensure the preservation of the scene, context, and evidence located 
in the ground. Starting a search with non-intrusive methods can highlight areas of interest that 
can later be searched using invasive methods. 
 
Geophysical Search Instruments 
Various geophysical instruments have gained popularity in the discipline of anthropology 
due to their frequent use in archaeology. The first documented use of geophysical technology in 
an archaeological setting dates back to the late 1930s, when a resistivity survey was performed to 
locate a stone vault under a church in Williamsburg, Virginia (Hunter and Cox, 2005). In the 
following decades, other geophysical instruments would be used to assist with archaeological 
surveys. Magnetometry first appeared in the 1950s to be followed by electromagnetics, magnetic 
susceptibility, and finally GPR, which was introduced in the field during the 1970s (Hunter and 
Cox, 2005). Still today, many archaeologists use geophysics as a non-intrusive search method to 
locate large features underground.  
Recently, the use of geophysical technologies has become a focus of research in the field 
of forensic archaeology (Hunter et al., 1997; Hunter and Cox, 2005). Research in the field of 
geophysics in forensic settings has largely been focused on GPR due to the quality of the results 
obtained, but some scientists are now performing research on other geophysical technologies that 
could be helpful in finding clandestine graves (Hunter and Cox, 2005). As early as 1970, earth 
resistivity studies had shown promising results in grave detection (Hunter and Cox, 2005). In the 
late 1980s, a group of scientists located in Colorado performed a multi-disciplinary study in 
which they used an array of methods and technologies to locate several buried pig carcasses 
(Davenport et al., 1992; France et al., 1992, 1997). The organization, known as NecroSearch 
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International Inc., employed a magnetometer, conductivity meter, and ground-penetrating radar 
to perform their study. The results showed that all three instruments can be used to detect 
clandestine graves. An important conclusion of this research was the realization that it is 
essential to calibrate a geophysical instrument prior to usage or else anomalies in the search area 
will not be mapped properly (Davenport et al., 1992). 
Bevan (1983) was one of the first scientists to present the results of conductivity, also 
known as electromagnetics, used in an anthropological context. Like other geophysical 
techniques, conductivity was first used in archaeology and showed an excellent capability of 
detecting large earth features such as refilled ditches or remnants of mounds (Bevan, 1983). 
Using electromagnetics, archaeologists were able to find the location of a fortification ditch near 
an 18th century French fort in Illinois, mounds and other unsuspected features at a prehistoric site 
in Oklahoma, and a sedimentation basin at a prehistoric settlement in Arizona (Bevan, 1983). 
Electromagnetics have also been extensively used overseas in archaeological settings, especially 
in Europe, since their first use in the 1940s (Wynn, 1986). Conductivity is a tool often used for 
mapping archaeological sites such as 5000-year-old shaft tombs in Jordan, and Greek settlements 
dating from the Roman and Early Byzantine periods (Rowlands and Sarris, 2007; Wynn, 1986). 
Although conductivity has shown potential on archaeological sites, this technique remains 
mostly untested in forensic settings. In recent years, conductivity meters have been greatly 
reduced in size to allow for uses in different fields. This new design is ideal for forensic scenes 
where the anomalies created by clandestine burials and buried forensic evidence tend to be 
shallow and much smaller than anomalies seen in archaeology. The smaller conductivity meters 
provide more accurate results at shallow depths, thus maximizing the chances to uncover buried 





Conductivity refers to the ability of a material to conduct electricity (Dupras et al., 2006; 
Killam, 2004). The conductivity meter consists of a transmitting coil that emits an 
electromagnetic wave which produces a primary magnetic field in the ground, and a receiving 
coil that detects the secondary magnetic field formed by a metallic object such as a handgun. The 
difference between the strength of two fields is proportional to the conductivity of the weapon or 
how much faster or slower electromagnetic currents are propagated through the weapon (Dupras 
et al., 2006; Killam, 2004; Sharma, 1997). Conductivity meters used in archaeological digs or 
forensic investigations are often built as a portable instrument with both transmitting and 
receiving coils located with the frame. This type of assemblage is called horizontal loop or 
slingram method (Dupras et al., 2006; Killam, 2004). This slingram method simply refers to the 
fact that the transmitting and receiving coils of the conductivity meter move simultaneously 
(Sharma, 1997). 
Conductivity is measured in two ways - through an automatic mode that takes readings 
every second, or through a manual mode in which readings are taken by pressing a button at 
specific locations. The instrument is also able to record the inphase (magnetic susceptibility) of 
the ground by also using the automatic and manual data collection modes. Conductivity and 
inphase measurements can also be taken in one of two dipoles or orientations - the vertical dipole 
(when the instrument is held vertically) is best for detecting data at greater depths, while the 
horizontal dipole (when the instrument is held horizontally) is better suited for objects near the 
surface (Reynolds, 2002). The conductivity meter measures ground conductivity using 
millisiemens per meter (mS/m). There is a direct relationship between conductivity and 
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millisiemens per meter - a better conductor will result in a greater value in mS/m (Killam, 2004). 
However, if the conductivity meter is in close proximity of a very conductive object, the readings 
can reach negative values. This is caused by the strong eddy currents located between the two 
coils and those located beyond the receiving coil (Ward, 1990). Values of conductivity can also 
be entered as a location enabling the surveyor to create maps showing the variations of 
conductivity in the area surveyed (Killam, 2004).  
Although a few studies mention that the conductivity meter could be applicable to crime 
scenes, no research has been performed to test these claims (France et al., 1992, 1997; Ruffell 
and McKinley, 2005). One case study shows that a conductivity meter was used in combination 
with ground-penetrating radar to accurately detect a body that had been buried for several years 
(Nobes, 2000). However, research has yet to be performed to test the applicability of geophysical 
technologies in detecting buried metallic weapons. 
The conductivity meter brings great advantages to a forensic investigation in that it can 
detect almost all types of metallic objects and even some clandestine graves if the backfill 
exhibits a strong contrast with the environment, it can be used in all types of terrain (such as a 
wooded area) and surfaces, and it provides a relatively quick way of surveying a suspect area as 
the surveyor is able to get a direct reading of the ground conductivity (see Table 1) (Dupras et 
al., 2006; Killam, 2004; Bevan, 1983; Davenport, 2001). However, one disadvantage is that the 
conductivity is extremely sensitive to surrounding large metallic objects, such as fences or 
underground pipes, and even small metallic items on the surveyor such as keys or a watch. The 
conductivity meter is also a very expensive piece of equipment that might not be readily 
available to all law enforcement agencies or forensic experts. Finally, the conductivity meter is a 
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complex geophysical tool that requires training before it can be properly operated, unlike more 
common geophysical technologies such as metal detectors (Dupras et al., 2006; Killam, 2004). 
 
Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Conductivity Meters 
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Can detect almost all types of 
metals 
• Can be used in all types of terrain 
• Quick 
• Provide direct readings 
• Expensive 
• Requires training to operate 




Due to the lack of published research and case studies utilizing the conductivity meter as 
a tool for forensic searches, there is a need for controlled research involving the conductivity 
meter.  Controlled geophysical research provides an ideal setting to test the applicability of 
geophysical technologies by burying known objects and attempting to detect the objects with 
geophysical instruments (Isaacson et al., 1999; Schultz, 2008; Schurr, 1997).  In addition, 
controlled experiments provide the opportunity to repeat surveys and provide replicable results 
that can then be applied to appropriate real-life situations (Isaacson et al., 1999; Schurr, 1997).    
Metallic weapons are often associated with forensic crime scenes and it is therefore 
important to test the ability of geophysical instruments to detect buried metallic evidence.  
Conductivity surveys can be performed in all types of environments and can be especially useful 
16 
 
in wooded areas where the ground-penetrating radar cannot provide accurate results due to the 
anomalies produced by the natural environment (Schultz et al., 2006; Schultz, 2007). Previous 
studies on conductivity have focused on its ability to detect earth features and clandestine graves 
and therefore there are no existing studies or results pertaining to metallic weapons.  
The conductivity meter represents only one facet of a larger research project designed to 
test the ability of several geophysical methods to detect buried metallic weapons. Using the same 
research site, this project has also tested a basic and an advanced metal detector, a magnetic 
locator, and a ground-penetrating radar. Data collection for both metal detectors and the 
magnetic locator was performed by another graduate student, Mrs. Mary Rezos, while the GPR 
was operated by Dr. John Schultz and Mr. Dennis Wardlaw, another graduate student. Findings 
from other geophysical instruments will be used to compare their results to the ones obtained 
with the conductivity meter. 
The objectives of this research will be to: (1) investigate the ability of the conductivity 
meter to detect buried weapons of various metallic components and sizes; (2) identify the 
approximate depths at which each weapon can no longer be detected; (3) to compare the results 
of the conductivity meter to other geophysical instruments that were tested for the larger 
geophysical project; and (4) to create some guidelines on the proper use of a conductivity meter 
in a forensic setting. The first chapter provides an introduction to the research project; the second 
chapter presents the results of the conductivity meter; the third chapter compares the ground-
penetrating radar and the conductivity meter; and finally, the fourth chapter summarizes the 
findings and provides a series of guidelines for law enforcement personnel utilizing a 




CHAPTER TWO: DETECTING BURIED METALLIC WEAPONS IN A 
CONTROLLED SETTING USING A CONDUCTIVITY METER 
 
Locating buried metallic weapons on forensic crime scenes can prove to be a very 
challenging task for law enforcement agencies. Often victims of very limited resources, these 
agencies do not have access to the best equipment available and do not have trained personnel to 
operate some of the more complex geophysical instruments like the conductivity meter and the 
ground-penetrating radar (Schultz, 2007; 2008). When searching for buried metallic weapons, a 
multidisciplinary approach should be favored and a forensic archaeologist with geophysical 
experience can prove to be a valuable asset to a forensic search (Schultz, 2007). When 
performing a search, it is important to begin the search with non-invasive techniques to avoid 
potential damage to the evidence or lose the context in which the evidence is located (Dupras et 
al., 2006; Hunter and Cox, 2005; Killam, 2004; Nickell and Fischer, 1999). Furthermore, non-
invasive techniques can locate specific areas where invasive techniques can then be used 
carefully. Studies performed on geophysical instruments such as the ground-penetrating radar 
have already shown their applicability in searching for unmarked, clandestine graves, but no 
studies have been conducted to try to detect buried metallic weapons. 
There is also a significant lack of literature on the use of the ground conductivity meter in 
forensic settings. Only one case study reports the use of a conductivity meter in combination 
with a ground-penetrating radar that accurately detected a body that had been buried for several 
years (Nobes, 2000). It is also very important that the research be conducted in a controlled 
setting to obtain results that can be replicated in real-life forensic searches. By studying the 
ability of the conductivity meter to detect buried metallic weapons in a controlled setting; this 
research will also lead to the creation of guidelines for law enforcement agencies on the proper 
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use of the conductivity meter in forensic searches and limitations of this geophysical instrument. 
In addition, this study will include an investigation of the effect of weapon size and burial depth 
on the ability of the conductivity meter to detect buried metallic weapons. The following 
questions will be addressed: 1) Is the conductivity better at detecting larger weapons than smaller 
weapons?; 2) What depth range would the conductivity meter be useful for?; and 3) How do 
transect intervals change the conductivity readings? 
 
Materials and Methods 
 The research site is located at the Lawson Lamar Firearms and Tactical Training Center 
for the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 14500 Wewahootee Road in Orlando, Florida. The site is 
a flat, unused section of the range that is covered by grass, which is mowed periodically, and is 
part of the overflow portion of a retention pond (Figure 1). A soil survey of Orange County 
classified the soil of the research site as a Smyrna-series spodosol (Doolittle and Schellentrager, 
1989). Spodosols are poorly drained soils characterized by spodic horizons (dark organic layers 
that may contain traces of iron, aluminum, and carbon) created in sandy marine sediment. 
However, extra soil was added when the range was built in order to raise the ground in this area. 
 
Figure 1: Research area at the Orange County Sheriff’s Office firearms range. The white box 
represents the approximate grid location. 
 
Twenty-six weapons, including firearms and blunt and sharp force weapons were 
decommissioned and donated to the project by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office (Tables 2, 3, 
and 4). The 16 firearms were specifically chosen by Steven Smith, firearm expert at the Orange 
County Sheriff’s Office, to represent a sample of street-level firearms used in crimes in Central 
Florida and consist of a Derringer, eight pistols, four revolvers, two shotguns, and a rifle. The 
blunt and sharp force weapons utilized for this research project are actual weapons that were 
seized by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and include hammers, brass knuckles, a machete, 
and a samurai sword. Finally six scrap metals were added to the grid to simulate materials that 





as weapons, include two pieces of iron pipes, one hollow copper tube, a piece of rebar, an 
aluminum pipe, and aluminum edging. All weapons were individually buried on a research grid 
measuring 19 m following the north-south axis and 16 m following the east-west axis (Figure 2). 
The weapons were placed in evenly spaced rows and columns to avoid false results due to the 
proximity of neighboring weapons. Each weapon was first buried horizontally, perpendicular to 
the transect lines, with the highest part of the weapon at a depth ranging between 45 and 50 cm. 
Plastic markers were used to pinpoint the exact above-ground location of each weapon without 
interfering with the conductivity readings. Approximately seven days were given between the 
burial date and data collection to ensure that the soil was fully compact and that positive results 
are not caused by the loose soil matrix. Once conductivity readings were completed for a 









Table 2: Firearms used at geophysical testing site 
Burial Firearm Metal Special Finish Length (cm)
A1 Davis Derringer D9 Steel Chrome-plated 11.9 
A2 Raven Arms MP25 Zinc Chrome-plated 12.3 
A3 Hi-Point Model C Steel/Polymer Blued 17.8 
A4 Smith & Wesson 5906 Stainless Steel  19.0 
A5 Glock Model 19 Polymer Blued/Tenifer 18.7 
B1 North American Arms  Stainless Steel  13.0 
B2 Jennings Bryco 59 Zinc Satin Nickel- 17.0 
B3 Smith & Wesson 686 Stainless Steel  23.5 
B4 Lorcin L380 Steel Blued 17.1 
B5 Colt Commander Steel Blued 19.6 
C1 Smith & Wesson Model Steel Nickel-plated 16.7 
C2 RG Industries RG23 Steel Blued 14.8 
C5 Mossberg Model 500A Steel/ Blued 71.1 
D5 Norinco AK Hunter Steel/Polymer Blued 106.7 
G1 Remington 870 Steel Parkerized 76.2 








Table 3: Scrap metals used at geophysical testing site 
Burial Location Type Metal Length (cm) 
C3 Aluminum Edging Aluminum 53 
C4 Solid Iron Pipe Iron 48 
D1 Hollow Copper Copper 68.5 
D2 Rusty Iron Pipe Iron 57 
D3 Solid Aluminum Aluminum 47.7 
D4 Rebar Iron 66.5 
 
Table 4: Blunt and sharp force weapons used at geophysical testing site 
Burial Location  Type Metal Length (cm) 
E-1 Scissors Steel 20 
E-2 Buck Knife Stainless Steel 22.2 
E-3 Prybar Steel 32.2 
E-4 Mallet Steel 38.4 
E-5 Machete Steel 68.2 
F-1 Baton Steel 25.7 
F-2 Philip’s Head Screwdriver Steel 26.2 
F-3 Brass Knuckles Brass  11.6 
F-4 Claw Hammer Steel 35 
F-5 Sword Steel 81 
 
 




 Prior to each data collection event, the conductivity meter was calibrated to the soil of the 
research area in order to accurately detect the anomalies in the grid. Data was collected using the 
conductivity meter on its vertical dipole (i.e. the instrument is held parallel to the ground surface) 
as it is indicated by the manufacturer’s instructions that the vertical dipole is recommended for 
depths over 40 cm (Geonics, 2006; Clay, 2005). Conductivity readings were taken in the manual 
mode to insure their precision. The readings were collected following transects from south to 
north recording conductivity measurements every 25 cm on each transect (Figure 3). The 
manufacturer recommended that transects be separated by half the length of the instrument (50 
cm. in the case of the meter-long EM-38 conductivity meter) (Geonics, 2006; Killam, 2004; 
Clay, 2005). Whenever possible, all transects were collected during the same day to avoid 
significant variations in the soil, such as the moisture level, that could affect the quality of the 
conductivity readings (Figure 4).  











Measurements were recorded using an Allegro CX Field Computer that was connected to the 
conductivity meter. Files were then transferred from the field computer to a desktop computer 
where they were processed by the Geonics software DAT 38 and analyzed using the Golden 
Software Surfer 8 software (version 8.4). The Surfer software was used to create contour maps of 
the conductivity readings of the research site using the default intervals with each contour line 
representing a difference of 0.5mS/m. Maps with an overlay of the exact locations of the 
weapons were created for each depth to determine which visible anomalies were produced by the 
buried weapons compared to those produced naturally by the soil. A weapon was classified as 
being detected if an anomaly was present at the location of the burial marker and the strength of 
the anomaly contains at least two continuous circular or semi-circular contour lines. In addition, 
the anomalies produced by the detected weapon were either classified as strong or weak 
anomalies based on the number of circular or semi-circular contour lines present. The presence 
of four or more continuous contour lines (e.g. a change of 2mS or more) indicated a strong 
anomaly and was considered to be a definite hit, while two or three contour lines (e.g. a change 
between 1 and 2mS) were considered to be a weak anomaly and a probable hit. Figure 7 shows a 
weak anomaly produced by C1 and a strong anomaly at C5. The difference between definite and 
probable hits will have direct consequences for real-life forensic searches. Areas where definite 
hits are detected will be the first to be investigated during a search followed by the probable hits 
if the strong anomalies did not reveal any weapon. Once all data was collected, the percentage of 
firearms, scrap metals, and blunt and sharp force weapons detected at each depth was 
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determined. Finally, summary tables are created to show if each weapon was a definite hit, a 
probable hit or a non-hit at each depth.  
  
Results 
 For each depth, the number of weapons detected was determined using the conductivity 
maps created from Golden Software’s Surfer program and was based on each of the three 
categories. The detected weapons were then classified within strong, or definite, hits; weak, or 
probable, hits; and non-hits. It is also important to see which weapons are detected and which are 
not, to determine the types of weapons for which the conductivity meter would prove to be a 
viable detection tool. The results will also be separated between transects collected at an interval 
of 25cm and transects collected at an interval of 50cm. This will facilitate the comparison 
between the two methods and assert the best interval for optimal detection of buried metallic 
weapons. Figures 5 through 8 show the different maps produced by the Surfer program using 














Figure 7: Research grid overlay with conductivity map for weapons buried between 50-55cm 




Figure 8: Research grid overlay with conductivity map for weapons buried between 50-55cm 






5-10cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 5-10cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to strongly detect 
all 32 (100%) of the metallic objects buried. 
 
5-10cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 5-10cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect all 32 
(100%) of the metallic objects buried. All 16 firearms and all six scrap metals were strongly 
detected, while nine of the ten miscellaneous weapons were strongly detected. The only 
miscellaneous weapon to produce a weak anomaly at this depth was the brass knuckles [F3]. 
 
10-15cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 10-15cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to strongly detect 
all 32 (100%) of the metallic objects buried. 
 
10-15cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 10-15cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect all 32 
(100%) of the metallic objects buried. All 16 firearms and all six scrap metals were strongly 
detected, while nine of the ten miscellaneous weapons were strongly detected. The only 
miscellaneous weapon to produce a weak anomaly at this depth was the brass knuckles [F3]. 
 
15-20cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 15-20cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to strongly detect 




15-20cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 15-20cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(31 out of 32, 97%) of the metallic objects buried: 16 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and nine out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. All 16 firearms and all six scrap metals 
were strongly detected, while nine of the ten miscellaneous weapons were strongly detected. The 
brass knuckles [F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
20-25cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 20-25cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(31 out of 32, 97%) of the metallic objects buried: 16 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and nine out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. All 16 firearms and all six scrap metals 
were strongly detected, while nine of the ten miscellaneous weapons were strongly detected. The 
brass knuckles [F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
20-25cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 20-25cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(31 out of 32, 97%) of the metallic objects buried: 16 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and nine out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. All 16 firearms and all six scrap metals 
were strongly detected, while nine of the ten miscellaneous weapons were strongly detected. The 





25-30cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 30-35cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(30 out of 32, 94%) of the metallic objects buried: 16 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and eight out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. All 16 firearms and all six scrap metals 
were strongly detected, while eight of the ten miscellaneous weapons were strongly detected. 
The screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles [F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
25-30cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 20-25cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(30 out of 32, 94%) of the metallic objects buried: 16 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and eight out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the 16 detected firearms, 14 
produced strong anomalies and two produced weak anomalies. The 14 strong anomalies were 
produced by ten of the largest firearms buried in the grid – seven handguns (Raven Arms MP25 
[A2], Hi-Point Model C [A3],Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], Glock Model 19 [A5], North 
American Arms [B1], Jennings Bryco 59 [B2], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], Colt 
Commander [B5], Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], RG Industries RG23 [C2], and Ruger P89 
[G2]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco 
AK Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were produced by the Davis Derringer [A1] and the 
Lorcin L380 [B4]. All six scrap metals were strongly detected. All eight detected blunt or sharp 
force weapons produced strong anomalies. The screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles [F3] 





30-35cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 30-35cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(30 out of 32, 94%) of the metallic objects buried: 16 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and eight out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the 16 detected firearms, 
fourteen produced strong anomalies and two produced weak anomalies. The ten strong 
anomalies were produced by ten of the largest firearms buried in the grid – seven handguns (Hi-
Point Model C [A3],Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], Glock Model 19 [A5], Smith & Wesson Model 
686 [B3], Colt Commander [B5], Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], and Ruger P89 [G2]), two 
shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK 
Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were produced by medium-sized, nickel-plated handguns 
(Davis Derringer D9 [A1], Raven Arms MP25 [A2], North American Arms [B1], Jennings 
Bryco 59 [B2], Lorcin L380 [B4], and RG Industries RG23 [C2]). Three scrap metals detected 
were classified as strong hits, while three produced weak hits. The strong hits were produced by 
the standard iron pipe [C4], the rusty iron pipe [D2], and the piece of rebar [D4]. The weak hits 
were produced by the aluminum edging [C3], the hollow copper tube [D1], and the aluminum 
pipe [D3]. The blunt or sharp force weapons produced seven strong hits and one weak hit, all 
eight objects being made out of steel. The scissors [E1], prybar [E3], mallet [E4], machete [E5], 
baton [F1], claw hammer [F4], and the sword [F5] produced strong anomalies while the buck 
knife [E2] produced a weak anomaly. The screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles [F3] were not 




30-35cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 35-40cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(29 out of 32, 91%) of the metallic objects buried: 15 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and eight out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the 16 detected firearms, 14 
produced strong anomalies and one produced a weak anomaly. The 14 strong anomalies were 
produced by ten of the largest firearms buried in the grid – seven handguns (Raven Arms MP25 
[A2], Hi-Point Model C [A3],Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], Glock Model 19 [A5], North 
American Arms [B1], Jennings Bryco 59 [B2], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], Colt 
Commander [B5], Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], RG Industries RG23 [C2], and Ruger P89 
[G2]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco 
AK Hunter [D5]). The weak anomaly was produced by the Lorcin L380 [B4]. Three scrap metals 
detected were classified as strong hits while three produced weak hits. The strong hits were 
produced by the standard iron pipe [C4], the rusty iron pipe [D2], and the piece of rebar [D4]. 
The weak hits were produced by the aluminum edging [C3], the hollow copper tube [D1], and 
the aluminum pipe [D3]. All eight detected blunt or sharp force weapons produced strong 
anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles [F3] were not 
detected at this depth. 
 
35-40cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 35-40cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(30 out of 32, 94%) of the metallic objects buried: 16 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and eight out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the 16 detected firearms, ten 
produced strong anomalies and six produced weak anomalies. The ten strong anomalies were 
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produced by ten of the largest firearms buried in the grid – seven handguns (Hi-Point Model C 
[A3],Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], Glock Model 19 [A5], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], Colt 
Commander [B5], Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], and Ruger P89 [G2]), two shotguns 
(Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). 
The weak anomalies were produced by medium-sized, nickel-plated handguns (Davis Derringer 
D9 [A1], Raven Arms MP25 [A2], North American Arms [B1], Jennings Bryco 59 [B2], Lorcin 
L380 [B4], and RG Industries RG23 [C2]). Three scrap metals detected were classified as strong 
hits, while three produced weak hits. The strong hits were produced by the standard iron pipe 
[C4], the rusty iron pipe [D2], and the piece of rebar [D4]. The weak hits were produced by the 
aluminum edging [C3], the hollow copper tube [D1], and the aluminum pipe [D3]. The blunt or 
sharp force weapons produced four seven hits and one weak hit, all eight objects being made out 
of steel. The scissors [E1], prybar [E3], mallet [E4], machete [E5], baton [F1], claw hammer 
[F4], and the sword [F5] produced strong anomalies while the buck knife [E2] produced a weak 
anomaly. The screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles [F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
35-40cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 35-40cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect almost all 
(28 out of 32, 88%) of the metallic objects buried: 15 out of 16 firearms, six out of six scrap 
metals, and seven out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the 16 detected firearms, ten 
produced strong anomalies and five produced weak anomalies. The ten strong anomalies were 
produced by ten of the largest firearms buried in the grid – seven handguns (Hi-Point Model C 
[A3],Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], Glock Model 19 [A5], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], Colt 
Commander [B5], Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], and Ruger P89 [G2]), two shotguns 
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(Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). 
The weak anomalies were produced by medium-sized, nickel-plated handguns (Raven Arms 
MP25 [A2], North American Arms [B1], Jennings Bryco 59 [B2], Lorcin L380 [B4], and RG 
Industries RG23 [C2]). Three scrap metals detected were classified as strong hits while three 
produced weak hits. The strong hits were produced by the standard iron pipe [C4], the rusty iron 
pipe [D2], and the piece of rebar [D4]. The weak hits were produced by the aluminum edging 
[C3], the hollow copper tube [D1], and the aluminum pipe [D3]. The blunt or sharp force 
weapons produced seven strong hits, all seven objects being made out of steel. The scissors [E1], 
prybar [E3], mallet [E4], machete [E5], baton [F1], claw hammer [F4], and the sword [F5] 
produced strong anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the buck knife [E2], the screwdriver [F2] and 
the brass knuckles [F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
40-45cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 40-45cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect over 
three quarters (27 out of 32, 84%) of the metallic objects buried: 14 out of 16 firearms, six out of 
six scrap metals, and seven out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the 14 detected 
firearms, nine produced strong anomalies and five produced weak anomalies. The nine strong 
anomalies were produced by nine of the largest firearms buried in the grid – six handguns (Smith 
& Wesson 5906 [A4], Glock Model 19 [A5], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], Colt 
Commander [B5], Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], and Ruger P89 [G2]), two shotguns 
(Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). 
The weak anomalies were produced by medium-sized, nickel-plated handguns (Raven Arms 
MP25 [A2], Hi-Point Model C [A3], North American Arms [B1], Jennings Bryco [B2], and RG 
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Industries RG23 [C2]). Three scrap metals detected were classified as strong hits while three 
produced weak hits. The strong hits were produced by the standard iron pipe [C4], the rusty iron 
pipe [D2], and the piece of rebar [D4]. The weak hits were produced by the aluminum edging 
[C3], the hollow copper tube [D1], and the aluminum pipe [D3]. The blunt or sharp force 
weapons produced six strong hits and one weak hit, all seven objects being made out of steel. 
The prybar [E3], mallet [E4], machete [E5], baton [F1], claw hammer [F4], and the sword [F5] 
produced strong anomalies while the scissors [E1] produced a weak anomaly. The Derringer 
[A1], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the buck knife [E2], the screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles 
[F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
40-45cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 40-45cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect over 
three quarters (26 out of 32, 81%) of the metallic objects buried: 14 out of 16 firearms, five out 
of six scrap metals, and seven out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the 14 detected 
firearms, eight produced strong anomalies and six produced weak anomalies. The eight strong 
anomalies were produced by nine of the largest firearms buried in the grid – six handguns (Smith 
& Wesson 5906 [A4], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], Colt Commander [B5], Smith & 
Wesson Model 37 [C1], and Ruger P89 [G2]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and 
Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were 
produced by medium-sized, nickel-plated handguns (Raven Arms MP25 [A2], Hi-Point Model C 
[A3], Glock Model 19 [A5], North American Arms [B1], Jennings Bryco [B2], and RG 
Industries RG23 [C2]). Three scrap metals detected were classified as strong hits while two 
produced weak hits. The strong hits were produced by the standard iron pipe [C4], the rusty iron 
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pipe [D2], and the piece of rebar [D4]. The weak hits were produced by the  hollow copper tube 
[D1] and the aluminum pipe [D3]. The blunt or sharp force weapons produced four six strong 
hits and two weak hits, all eight objects being made out of steel. The prybar [E3], mallet [E4], 
machete [E5], baton [F1], claw hammer [F4], and the sword [F5] produced strong anomalies 
while the scissors [E1] and the buck knife [E2] produced weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], 
the Lorcin L380 [B4], the aluminum edging [C3], the buck knife [E2], the screwdriver [F2] and 
the brass knuckles [F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
45-50cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 45-50cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect just over 
half (16 out of 30, 53%) of the metallic objects buried: eight out of 14 firearms, two out of six 
scrap metals, and six out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the eight detected firearms, 
six produced strong anomalies and two produced weak anomalies. The six strong anomalies were 
produced by the six largest firearms buried in the grid – four handguns (Smith & Wesson 5906 
[A4], Glock Model 19 [A5], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], and the Colt Commander [B5]), 
a shotgun (Mossberg Model 500A [C5]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). The weak 
anomalies were produced by medium-sized, nickel-plated handguns (Smith & Wesson Model 37 
[C1] and Jennings Bryco 59 [B2]). Both scrap metals detected were classified as strong hits and 
were both pieces of iron pipe. One piece was standard iron [C4] while the other was composed of 
rusty iron [D2]. The blunt or sharp force weapons produced four strong hits and two weak hits, 
all six objects being made out of steel. The machete [E5], mallet [E4], prybar [E3], and claw 
hammer [F4] produced strong anomalies, while the baton [F1] and the sword [F5] produced 
weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C [A3], the 
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North American Arms [B1], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], 
the copper tube [D1], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife 
[E2], the screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles [F3] were not detected at this depth. 
 
45-50cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 45-50cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect half (15 
out of 30, 50%) of the metallic objects buried: seven out of 14 firearms, two out of six scrap 
metals, and six out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the seven detected firearms, four 
produced strong anomalies and three produced weak anomalies. The four strong anomalies were 
produced by four of largest firearms buried in the grid – two handguns (Smith & Wesson 5906 
[A4] and Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3]), a shotgun (Mossberg Model 500A [C5]), and a rifle 
(Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were produced by medium-sized handguns 
(Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], Glock Model 19 [A5], and Jennings Bryco 59 [B2]). Both 
scrap metals detected were classified as strong hits and were both pieces of iron pipe. One piece 
was standard iron [C4] while the other was composed of rusty iron [D2]. The blunt or sharp force 
weapons produced three strong hits and three weak hits, all six objects being made out of steel. 
The machete [E5], mallet [E4], and claw hammer [F4] produced strong anomalies, while the 
prybar [E3], the baton [F1], and the sword [F5] produced weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], 
the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C [A3], the North American Arms [B1], the Lorcin 
L380 [B4], the Colt Commander [B5], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the copper 
tube [D1], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the 




50-55cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 50-55cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect just 
under half (15 out of 32, 47%) of the metallic objects buried: nine out of 16 firearms, one out of 
six scrap metals, and five out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the nine detected 
firearms, seven produced strong anomalies and two produced weak anomalies. The six strong 
anomalies were produced by the largest firearms buried in the grid – three handguns (Smith & 
Wesson 5906 [A4], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], Glock Model 19 [A5], and Ruger P89 
[G2]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco 
AK Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were produced by medium-sized handguns (Smith & 
Wesson Model 37 [C1], and Colt Commander [B5]). The one scrap metal detected was classified 
as a weak hit (rusty iron pipe [D2]). The blunt or sharp force weapons produced one strong hit 
and four weak hits, all five objects being made out of steel. The machete [E5] produced a strong 
anomaly, while the prybar [E3], baton [F1], mallet [E4], and the claw hammer [F4] produced 
weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C [A3], the 
North American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the RG 23 [C2], the 
aluminum edging [C3], the solid iron pipe [C4], the copper tube [D1], the aluminum pipe [D3], 
the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles 
[F3], and the sword [F5] were not detected at this depth. 
 
50-55cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 50-55cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect under 
half (13 out of 32, 40%) of the metallic objects buried: eight out of 16 firearms, none of the six 
scrap metals, and five out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the eight detected firearms, 
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five produced strong anomalies and three produced weak anomalies. The five strong anomalies 
were produced by the largest firearms buried in the grid – two handguns (Smith & Wesson 5906 
[A4] and Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and 
Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were 
produced by medium-to-large-sized handguns (Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], Glock Model 
19 [A5], and Ruger [G2]). The blunt or sharp force weapons produced two strong hits and two 
weak hits, all four objects being made out of steel. The machete [E5] and the mallet [E4] 
produced strong anomalies, while the prybar [E3], the baton [F1], and the claw hammer [F4] 
produced weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C 
[A3], the Glock [A5], the North American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 
[B4], the Colt Commander [B5], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the solid iron pipe 
[C4], the copper tube [D1], the rusty iron pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar [D4], the 
scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles [F3], and the sword 
[F5] were not detected at this depth. 
 
55-60cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 55-60cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect just 
under half (14 out of 32, 44%) of the metallic objects buried: eight out of 16 firearms, one out of 
six scrap metals, and five out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the eight detected 
firearms, six produced strong anomalies and two produced weak anomalies. The six strong 
anomalies were produced by the largest firearms buried in the grid – three medium-to-large-sized 
handguns (Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], Smith &Wesson Model 686 [B3], and Ruger P89 [G2]), 
two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK 
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Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were produced by medium-to-large-sized handguns (Smith & 
Wesson Model 37 [C1] and Glock [A5]). The scrap metal was detected as a weak anomaly and 
was produced by the rusty iron pipe [D2]. The blunt or sharp force weapons produced one strong 
hit and four weak hits, all five objects being made out of steel. The machete [E5] produced the 
strong anomaly, while the prybar [E3], mallet [E4], baton [F1], and the claw hammer [F4] 
produced weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C 
[A3], the North American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt 
Commander [B5], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the solid iron pipe [C4], the 
copper tube [D1], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], 
the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles [F3], and the sword [F5] were not detected at this depth. 
 
55-60cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 55-60cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect under 
half (12 out of 32, 38%) of the metallic objects buried: seven out of 16 firearms, none of the six 
scrap metals, and five out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the seven detected 
firearms, four produced strong anomalies and three produced weak anomalies. The four strong 
anomalies were produced by the largest firearms buried in the grid – one large handgun (Smith & 
Wesson 5906 [A4]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a 
rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). The weak anomalies were produced by medium-to-large-sized 
handguns (Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], and Ruger P89 
[G2]). The blunt or sharp force weapons produced one strong hit and four weak hits, all five 
objects being made out of steel. The machete [E5] produced the strong anomaly, while the 
prybar [E3], mallet [E4], baton [F1], and the claw hammer [F4] produced weak anomalies. The 
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Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C [A3], the Glock [A5], the North 
American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt Commander 
[B5], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the solid iron pipe [C4], the copper tube [D1], 
the rusty iron pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck 
knife [E2], the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles [F3], and the sword [F5] were not detected at 
this depth.  
 
60-65cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 60-65cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect  just over 
a third (11 out of 32, 34%) of the metallic objects buried: seven out of 16 firearms, none of the 
six scrap metals, and four out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the seven detected 
firearms, four produced strong anomalies and three produced weak anomalies. The four strong 
anomalies were produced by some of the largest firearms buried in the grid – two large-sized 
handguns (Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], Smith &Wesson Model 686 [B3]) and two shotguns 
(Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]). The weak anomalies were produced by 
medium-to-large-sized handguns (Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1] and Ruger P89 [G2]) and a 
rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). The blunt or sharp force weapons produced four weak hits, all 
four objects being made out of steel. The machete [E5], mallet [E4], baton [F1], and the claw 
hammer [F4] produced the weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-
Point Model C [A3], the Glock [A5], the North American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], 
the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt Commander [B5], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], 
the solid iron pipe [C4], the copper tube [D1], the rusty iron pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe [D3], 
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the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the prybar [E3], the screwdriver [F2], the 
brass knuckles [F3], and the sword [F5] were not detected at this depth. 
 
60-65cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 60-65cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect  just over 
a quarter (nine out of 32, 28%) of the metallic objects buried: six out of 16 firearms, none of the 
six scrap metals, and three out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the seven detected 
firearms, two produced strong anomalies and four produced weak anomalies. The two strong 
anomalies were produced by the two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 
[G1]). The weak anomalies were produced by four of the largest handguns (Smith & Wesson 
5906 [A4], Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3], and Ruger P89 [G2]) and a rifle (Norinco AK 
Hunter [D5]). The blunt or sharp force weapons produced three weak hits, all four objects being 
made out of steel. The machete [E5], mallet [E4], and the baton [F1] produced the weak 
anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C [A3], the Glock 
[A5], the North American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt 
Commander [B5], the Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging 
[C3], the solid iron pipe [C4], the copper tube [D1], the rusty iron pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe 
[D3], the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the prybar [E3], the screwdriver [F2], 






65-70cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 65-70cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect less than 
a quarter (seven out of 32, 22%) of the metallic objects buried: five out of 16 firearms, none of 
the six scrap metals, and two out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the five detected 
firearms, one produced a strong anomaly and four produced weak anomalies. The Smith & 
Wesson 5906 [A4] produced the strong anomaly. The weak anomalies were produced by a large-
sized handgun (Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [C5] 
and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). The blunt or sharp force 
weapons produced two weak hits, both objects being made out of steel. The machete [E5] and 
the baton [F1] produced the weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-
Point Model C [A3], the Glock [A5], the North American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], 
the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt Commander [B5], the Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], the RG 
23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the solid iron pipe [C4], the copper tube [D1], the rusty iron 
pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the 
prybar [E3], the mallet [E4], the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles [F3], the claw hammer 
[F4], the sword [F5], and the Ruger [G2] were not detected at this depth. 
 
 
65-70cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 65-70cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect a quarter 
(seven out of 32, 22%) of the metallic objects buried: five out of 16 firearms, none of the six 
scrap metals, and two out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the five detected firearms, 
all five produced weak anomalies. The weak anomalies were produced by two of the largest 
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handguns (Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], and Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3]), two shotguns 
(Mossberg Model 500A [C5] and Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [D5]). 
The blunt or sharp force weapons produced two weak hits, both objects being made out of steel. 
The machete [E5] and the baton [F1] produced the weak anomalies. The Derringer [A1], the 
Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C [A3], the Glock [A5], the North American Arms [B1], 
the Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt Commander [B5], the Smith & Wesson 
Model 37 [C1], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the solid iron pipe [C4], the copper 
tube [D1], the rusty iron pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the 
buck knife [E2], the prybar [E3], the mallet [E4], the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles [F3], 
the claw hammer [F4], the sword [F5], and the Ruger [G2] were not detected at this depth.  
 
 
70-75cm 25cm Transects 
At a depth of 70-75cm, using 25cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect  less than 
a sixth (five out of 32, 16%) of the metallic objects buried: four out of 16 firearms, none of the 
six scrap metals, and one out of ten blunt or sharp force weapons. Out of the four detected 
firearms, all four produced weak anomalies. The weak anomalies were produced by a large-sized 
handgun (Smith &Wesson Model 686 [B3]), two shotguns (Mossberg Model 500A [D5] and 
Remington 870 [G1]), and a rifle (Norinco AK Hunter [C5]). The blunt or sharp force weapons 
produced one weak hit from the steel baton [F1]. The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  
Hi-Point Model C [A3], the Smith & Wesson Model 5906 [A4], the Glock [A5], the North 
American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt Commander 
[B5], the Smith & Wesson Model 37 [C1], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the solid 
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iron pipe [C4], the copper tube [D1], the rusty iron pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe [D3], the rebar 
[D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the prybar [E3], the mallet [E4], the machete [E5], 
the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles [F3], the claw hammer [F4], the sword [F5], and the 
Ruger [G2] were not detected at this depth. 
 
 
70-75cm 50cm Transects 
At a depth of 70-75cm, using 50cm transects, the conductivity meter was able to detect  less than 
a tenth (three out of 32, 9%) of the metallic objects buried: three out of 16 firearms, and none of 
the six scrap metals, and none of the ten blunt or sharp force weapons. All three detected 
firearms produced weak anomalies. The weak anomalies were produced by one of the largest 
handguns (Smith & Wesson Model 686 [B3]) and two shotguns (Remington 870 [G1] and 
Mossberg 500A [D5]). The Derringer [A1], the Raven Arms [A2], the  Hi-Point Model C [A3], 
the Smith & Wesson Model 5906 [A4], the Glock [A5], the North American Arms [B1], the 
Jennings Bryco [B2], the Lorcin L380 [B4], the Colt Commander [B5], the Smith & Wesson 
Model 37 [C1], the RG 23 [C2], the aluminum edging [C3], the solid iron pipe [C4], the Norinco 
AK Hunter [C5], the copper tube [D1], the rusty iron pipe [D2], the aluminum pipe [D3], the 
rebar [D4], the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the prybar [E3], the mallet [E4], the machete 
[E5], the baton [F1], the screwdriver [F2], the brass knuckles [F3], the claw hammer [F4], the 
sword [F5], and the Ruger [G2] were not detected at this depth. 
 
75-80cm 25cm Transects 




75-80cm 50cm Transects 
None of the weapons were detected at this depth. 
 
 The following figures (Figure 9-14) summarize the results of the conductivity meter for 
each weapon for both transect intervals. The dark grey bars correspond to the depths at which the 
weapons were detected strongly while the light grey bars represent the depths at which the 
weapons were weakly detected. The absence of a bar indicates that the weapon was undetected at 







Figure 9: Summary of results for firearm detection with 25cm transects 
 
 











Figure 12: Summary of results for miscellaneous weapon detection with 50cm transects 
 
 










 Overall, the conductivity proved to be a valuable tool in the detection of buried metallic 
weapons up to a depth of 75cm. The results showed that the size of the weapon plays an 
important role in whether or not it is detected by the conductivity meter. As anticipated, the 
smaller weapons were not detected as easily as the larger weapons at shallow depths and they 
were the first ones to be lost as depth increased. At a depth of 35-40cm, only two weapons 
remained completely undetected: the screwdriver [F2] and the brass knuckles [F3]. At that same 
depth, three additional weapons were produced weak hits: the derringer [A1], the aluminum 
edging [C3], and the aluminum pipe [D3]. All five of these weapons and scrap metals are among 
the smallest of our sample. On the other hand, at a depth of 70-75cm, five weapons were still 
being weakly detected. These five weapons represented some of the largest weapons found in 
our grid: a Smith & Wesson 686 [B3], two shotguns [D5] and [G1], a rifle [C5], and a steel baton 
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[F1]. Therefore, it can be assumed that the conductivity meter will be more effective in finding 
larger weapons than smaller ones. 
 The weapon’s depth is another variable that needs to be considered when performing a 
geophysical survey with a ground conductivity meter. Starting with the shallowest depth 
collected (5-10cm), the number of weapons being detected by the conductivity meter 
consistently deceases until a depth of 75-80cm where no weapon was detected (Figures 9-14). 
This decrease in the number of weapons detected occurs relatively slowly until a depth of 
approximately 60-65cm. At this point, several weapons are being lost at each new depth 
surveyed. There is also a significant drop in the number of weapons detected between the 40-
45cm depth and the 45-50cm depth. This coincides perfectly with the manufacturer’s 
recommendation in the conductivity meter operating manual. It states that the detection ability of 
the conductivity meter on its vertical mode of action peaks around a depth of 40cm and then 
slowly decreases with increasing depth. 
 The transect interval is another variable that needs to be addressed if one is using a 
conductivity meter for a forensic search. According to the results, surveys performed using 25cm 
intervals always detected a number greater or equal to the number of weapons detected at the 
same depth by a survey using 50cm intervals. The 50cm intervals detected on average two fewer 
weapons than the 25cm intervals at the same depth. However, the difference was the greatest at 
the 50-55cm depth where the 25cm intervals detected five weapons that the 50cm intervals 
missed. On the other hand, both transect intervals detected the same number of weapons at 
depths of 35-40cm, 40-45cm, and 65-70cm, and every depth above 30cm. It is also important to 
note that the weapons that showed different detection patterns from one transect interval to the 
other were usually some of the smallest weapons still being detected at that depth. As expected, 
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the larger weapons such as the shotguns and the rifle were not affected by the different transect 
intervals. At a depth of 30-35cm, the conductivity readings were also collected using transects 
along the east-west axis instead of using transects following the north-south axis to determine the 
effect of transect orientation on the strength and number of anomalies detected. It was 
determined that transect orientation does not impact the conductivity readings as the number of 
weapons detected did not vary. 
 The metal composition of the weapons also had an effect on the depth of detection. 
Results demonstrated that items made of or containing parts made of aluminum, brass, copper, or 
zinc were detected at shallower depths compared to weapons of similar size made of iron or 
steel. The Lorcin [B4] is considered as a medium-sized handgun, but produced a strong anomaly 
only down to a depth of 25-30cm, the same depth as the Derringer [A1], the smallest weapon in 
the sample. This is due to the fact that the Lorcin [B4] contains an aluminum frame and 
magazine. The RG23 [C2] and the Raven Arms [A2] were the two weapons that produced a 
strong anomaly up to a depth of 30-35cm and are comprised of an aluminum frame with a steel 
barrel, and a zinc allow frame with an aluminum clip, respectively. Finally the Jennings Bryco 
[B2] was detected at a shallower depth than the similar S&W 37 [C1] due to the fact that the 
Bryco [B2] is made of a zinc alloy with a steel clip rather than being completely made of steel. 
Similarly, the three scrap metals with the shallowest depths of detection were made of aluminum 
or copper. 
 The results thus evidenced the need to adapt the forensic search to the type of weapon 
being searched for. The size of the weapon, the burial depth of the weapon, and the transect 
intervals will have an effect on the ability of the conductivity meter to detect these weapons. 
Smaller weapons will be more difficult to detect, especially if not buried at a very shallow depth. 
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In contrast, larger weapons will be much easier to detect even at depths over half a meter. The 
transect interval will also impact the quality of the results obtained. Performing a geophysical 
survey with transect intervals greater than those needed will result in a loss in the number of 
weapons detected. In this case, although the manufacturer suggested an interval of 50cm (half of 
the instrument’s length), pre-tests showed that two small weapons were missed during data 
collection with 50cm transects. Therefore, it is important to adapt the transect interval to the 
weapons being searched for. In this case, 25cm proved to be the ideal interval. 
 The conductivity meter can provide several advantages from which a forensic search can 
benefit. The versatility of the conductivity meter enables law enforcement agencies to be able to 
use it in all types of environments, especially wooded environments or terrains with a significant 
slope where the ground-penetrating radar could not be utilized. The conductivity meter’s external 
digital display gives the operator an overall measurement of the conductivity in the area. It is 
therefore easy to perform a quick survey by looking at the conductivity readings and 
investigating the areas with strong signals more carefully afterwards. The maps created by the 
Surfer software permit a three-dimensional representation of the data collected, something 
impossible with some of the cheaper equipment such as metal detectors and magnetic locators. 
However, the conductivity meter does also have its drawbacks. The equipment is very expensive 
and it requires extensive training before it can be properly operated. Although the conductivity 
provides three-dimensional data, one cannot infer the depth of the weapons strictly from a 
conductivity map. The conductivity meter is also very sensitive to surrounding metals and thus a 
forensic search should not be performed with a conductivity meter with the area is close to a 
metallic fence or if pipes are running below the ground surface. Such large metallic structures 
can interfere with the readings obtained from the weapons and provide false anomalies. Finally, 
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the conductivity meter is very sensitive to moisture and it should not be used soon after a rain 
shower or in an area that has recently been inundated or still with standing water. The moisture 
in the ground will enhance the anomaly created by the disturbed soil and may mask the response 
from the weapon. 
 
Conclusion 
 Controlled research is essential to determine to applicability of the conductivity meter to 
forensic searches. A number of conclusions concerning the applicability of the conductivity 
meter to real-life forensic searches can be derived from this research. The control hole included 
in the grid demonstrated that the anomalies recorded by the conductivity meter were the result of 
the buried metallic weapons and not the result of the disturbed soil. This study also showed that 
the conductivity is a useful geophysical instrument to detect buried metallic weapons up to a 
depth of approximately 75cm depending on the weapon being searched for. Finally, the research 
provided guidelines for the type of environment necessary for proper surveying, specifically 
regarding the effect of water and moisture in the soil on the conductivity readings.  
 Due to the lack of literature on the applications of the conductivity meter in forensic 
settings, there is a wide variety of projects that could be pursued next. It would be interesting to 
test the applicability of the conductivity meter in different soils and different environments such 
as wooded areas where the ground-penetrating radar cannot be used. It would also be interesting 
to test the ability of the conductivity meter to detect unmarked burials or buried human skeletal 




CHAPTER THREE: DETECTING BURIED METALLIC WEAPONS IN A 
CONTROLLED SETTING USING A GROUND-PENETRATING RADAR 
 
Introduction 
 The field of forensic geoscience, which uses the physical properties of the ground to 
assist legal investigations, has been expanding rapidly in recent years due to its ability to help 
law enforcement personnel performing forensic searches (Murray, 2004; Murray and Tedrow, 
1975; Pye and Croft, 2004; Ruffell and McKinley, 2005).  More specifically, forensic geoscience 
has investigated the potential of geophysical instruments to improve the search methods 
currently used by law enforcement. These geophysical instruments are non-invasive search 
methods that can be used on crime scenes as part of a multidisciplinary approach to detect buried 
evidence such as clandestine graves or metallic weapons. The advantage of remote-sensing 
instruments is that the search area can be investigated without damaging the site and identifying 
areas of interest through detection of anomalies in the ground. By identifying the areas of interest 
prior to the use of invasive search methods, damage to the evidence and context in which the 
evidence is found is minimized. Geophysical technologies can also be useful to clear a suspected 
area without resorting to excavations, thus saving precious time for law enforcement agencies. 
 In order to investigate the potential of these geophysical tools, it is recommended to use 
specific controlled research areas. Controlled sites provide an environment to study the ability of 
geophysical instruments to detect buried weapons or clandestine graves and learning from those 
results to build guidelines applicable to various search environments. Controlled settings also 
provide an opportunity for the operator to gain valuable experience and techniques to maximize 
the benefits of a specific geophysical tool as well as understanding a tool’s limitations (Isaacson 
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et al., 1999; Schurr, 1997). The numerous benefits of controlled research areas have led to the 
construction of several facilities designed to test geophysical instruments, train individuals, and 
perform research (Isaacson et al., 1999). The ground-penetrating radar (GPR) is an example of a 
geophysical tool that has benefited from controlled research. Several studies have been 
performed in known settings to test the applicability of the GPR for search for buried bodies in 
various types of soils and to increase operator experience (Davenport et al., 1990; France et al., 
1992; France et al., 1997; Freeland et al., 2003; Schultz, 2003; Schultz et al., 2006).  
Specifically, research performed with the GPR was designed to study the detection of a 
decomposing body by the instrument over a long period of time using pigs as proxies for human 
bodies. Studies have also been conducted to test the effect of various soils and depths on the 
ability of the GPR to detect the bodies. Results of these controlled studies are now being used by 
law enforcement agencies in forensic searches (Davenport, 2001a; Mellett, 1992; Nobes, 2000; 
Reynolds, 1997; Schultz, 2007).    
 The GPR is an electromagnetic tool that emits continuous electromagnetic pulses of short 
duration which propagate from the transmitting unit in the antenna downward into the ground.  
With the placement of the antenna on the ground, the signal penetrates into the subsurface, and is 
reflected, refracted, and scattered as it encounters materials of contrasting electrical properties 
such as differing soil features, voids, moisture, and metallic differences. The receiving portion of 
the antenna records the returning signal and sends it back to the control unit along a different line 
located within the cable. The control unit formats the reflected signal for immediate display on a 
video monitor.  The data can also be downloaded to an external computer for processing and 
analysis.  One of the great advantages of the GPR is that it provides great resolution because the 
data is displayed on the monitor for immediate assessment in the field.  However, there are a 
61 
 
number of drawbacks to using GPR.  The equipment is very expensive compared to metal 
detectors, specialized training is required to operate the equipment, the data may require 
processing, and the data requires interpretation from an experienced technician.  Furthermore, 
GPR works best with optimal soil and site conditions such as dry, sandy soils and clear and flat 
site conditions. 
 This article will (1) investigate the ability of the ground-penetrating radar to detect buried 
metallic weapons, (2) identify the effect of various variables (size, metal composition, depth) on 
detection, (3) compare the results of the GPR using different transect intervals, and (4) compare 
the results of the GPR with the results of the conductivity meter. 
 
Materials and Methods 
This research project was performed in a controlled area located at the Lawson Lamar 
Firearms and Tactical Training Center for the Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 14500 
Wewahootee Road in Orlando, Florida. Prior to this research, the site was a grassy, unused area 
of the range mowed periodically (Figure 15). This part of the range was also part of the overflow 
of a retention pond and extra soil was added to raise the ground when the training center was 
built. The Orange county soil survey identified the soil present in the research site as a Smyrna-
series spodosol (Doolittle and Schellentrager, 1989). This type of soil is poorly-drained and is 
generally comprised of dark spodic horizons containing traces of iron, aluminum, and carbon. 
 
Figure 15: Research area at the Orange County Sheriff’s Office firearms range. The white box 
represents the approximate grid location. 
 
A total of 32 weapons were used in the sample for this research project (Tables 5,6, and 
7). Sixteen firearms representing the most common firearms found street-level in Orlando, 
Florida as well as ten blunt or sharp edged weapons were decommissioned and donated to the 
project by the Orange County Sheriff’s Office. In addition, six pieces of scrap metals were 
included in the sample to represent common metals that may be found in an area where a 
forensic search in being performed. Some of the weapons in the sample include pistols, 
revolvers, shotguns, rifle, machete, sword, hammers, brass knuckles, and iron, copper, and 
aluminum pipes. A grid measuring 19m on the north-south axis and 16m on the east-west is in 





placed in rows and columns with enough spacing between each weapon to prevent false results 
from neighboring weapons. All 32 weapons were buried horizontally in the burial hole, 
perpendicular to the transect lines, with each weapon’s highest point in between a 5cm depth 
interval. Plastic markers were used to locate the exact position of the weapon in the burial hole. 
Data collection was performed approximately one week after weapons were put in the ground to 
prevent false anomalies from the soil disruption. Once data collection was finished, weapons 
were dug up and reburied 5cm deeper until a depth of 70-75cm, depth at which all other 


















Table 5: Firearms used at geophysical testing site 
Burial Firearm Metal Special Finish Length (cm)
A1 Davis Derringer D9 Steel Chrome-plated 11.9 
A2 Raven Arms MP25 Zinc Chrome-plated 12.3 
A3 Hi-Point Model C Steel/Polymer Blued 17.8 
A4 Smith & Wesson 5906 Stainless  19.0 
A5 Glock Model 19 Polymer Blued/Tenifer 18.7 
B1 North American Arms  Stainless  13.0 
B2 Jennings Bryco 59 Zinc Satin Nickel- 17.0 
B3 Smith & Wesson 686 Stainless  23.5 
B4 Lorcin L380 Steel Blued 17.1 
B5 Colt Commander Steel Blued 19.6 
C1 Smith & Wesson Model Steel Nickel-plated 16.7 
C2 RG Industries RG23 Steel Blued 14.8 
C5 Mossberg Model 500A Steel/ Blued 71.1 
D5 Norinco AK Hunter Steel/Polymer Blued 106.7 
G1 Remington 870 Steel Parkerized 76.2 









Table 6: Scrap metals used at geophysical testing site 
Burial Location Type Metal Length (cm) 
C3 Aluminum Edging Aluminum 53 
C4 Solid Iron Pipe Iron 48 
D1 Hollow Copper Copper 68.5 
D2 Rusty Iron Pipe Iron 57 
D3 Solid Aluminum Aluminum 47.7 
D4 Rebar Iron 66.5 
 
Table 7: Blunt and sharp force weapons used at geophysical testing site 
Burial Location  Type Metal Length (cm) 
E-1 Scissors Steel 20 
E-2 Buck Knife Stainless Steel 22.2 
E-3 Prybar Steel 32.2 
E-4 Mallet Steel 38.4 
E-5 Machete Steel 68.2 
F-1 Baton Steel 25.7 
F-2 Philip’s Head Screwdriver Steel 26.2 
F-3 Brass Knuckles Brass  11.6 
F-4 Claw Hammer Steel 35 
F-5 Sword Steel 81 
 
 







The GPR system that was used for this project is a MALA RAMAC X3M with 800- and 
500-MHz antennae that were integrated into a cart and pushed over the survey area (Figure 17).  
The unit consisted of a control unit mounted to the top of the antenna, a monitor with a hard 
drive for data storage, and a survey wheel which is integrated into the cart.  Depth of 
investigation and vertical resolution are two important considerations when choosing the 
appropriate antenna.  A decrease in antenna frequency (e.g., 250-MHz) will increase the depth of 
investigation while decreasing the vertical resolution of the subsurface.  The 500-MHz, or 
similar frequency, antenna provides an excellent compromise between depth of viewing and 
vertical resolution and is a common type used for archaeological and forensic applications 
(Schultz, 2007; Schultz et al., 2006).  Conversely, an increase in antenna frequency (e.g., 900-
MHz) will decrease the depth of investigation while increasing the vertical resolving capabilities 
of subsurface objects.  Depending on the subsurface and size of forensic targets in question, a 
higher frequency antenna may detect multiple false anomalies or clutter (produced from pipes, 
roots, stumps, garbage, rocks, differences in moisture content, etc.) making it impossible to 
discern the target in question.  It is important to note that the antenna generally transmits a cone-
shaped electromagnetic wave directly below the antenna when it is placed in the standard 















Figure 17: MALA RAMAC X3M with GPR unit with 500-MHz antenna integrated into a cart 
 
Prior to each data collection event, depth calibration of the GPR was performed to ensure 
accurate depth readings due to daily moisture-content changes in the soil. The GPR was 
calibrated for depth by pulling the instrument over a number of the larger weapons of column 
five. Since the depth was known for the weapons, the necessary adjustments were made to 
ensure that the apex of the hyperbola was at the correct depth. Data were collected over the 
research area using a 15m (west to east) by 19m (south to north) grid along gridlines oriented 
along the 19m axis of the grid using 10cm spacing (Figure 18).  All of the data collection was 
performed along the same direction starting at the southern end of the grid and traveling north.  It 
is usually good practice to collect all transects in the same direction rather than alternating 
directions.  Next, gridline transects were spaced every 10cm to ensure detection of small 
weapons.  Transects for each depth were all collected during the same day to avoid significant 





readings.  Next, gridline transects were taken directly over the five rows of buried items.  Rows 1 
and 2 consisted of seven buried items, row 3 consisted of six buried items and a control hole, and 
rows 4 and 5 consisted of six buried items (Figure 19).      
 








Figure 19: Rows used for radargrams 
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Finally, the last component of this research consisted of processing and presenting the 
GPR data.  Initially, GPR-SLICE was used for the data processing.  However, data processing 
issues with small subsurface anomaly identification resulted in using REFLEXW, version 4.5, 
GPR software.  The first step was to process the data using a variety of steps.  The next step was 
to create radargrams or transects of the five rows.  Third, all of the transects (radargrams) were 
welded together to create a 3-D cube.  The GPR data are first presented in 2-D time slices, or Z-
slices, that are planview representations of the grid data at different depths. The different colors 
represent different amplitudes.  An option is provided to change the colorform to utilize a variety 
of colors that best highlight the targets in question.  Fourth, fence diagrams were created from 
the 3-D model that incorporated a Z-slice and a Y-slice (radargram).     
 
Results 
The most favorable results were seen when the weapons were buried between 60-65cm 
because the data were collected when flooding was not an issue at the site.  Increased moisture at 
the research site from flooding produced poor GPR imagery for many of the tested depths and 
therefore many of the depths shallower than 60-65cm did not produce good radargrams. In 
addition, this depth was the last one in which all 32 weapons produced a visible anomaly using 
the GPR. The various image options for presentation of the GPR data provided multiple views to 
discern the forensic targets.  Figure 20 is a GPR radargram of row 3 taken with a 500-MHz 
antenna at a depth of 60-65cm.  On the radargram, right left to represents length and top to 
bottom represents depth.  Markers on the top of GPR profiles represent the location of the buried 
weapons. The one feature that stands out in Figure 20 is a row of six hyperbolic anomalies 
attributed to the brass knuckles (F3), the prybar (E3), the solid aluminum pipe (D3), the 
aluminum edging (C3), the Smith & Wesson Model 686 (B3), and the Hi-Point Model C (A3).  
The hyperbolic anomaly is the most striking feature noted when a single item is detected in the 
soil subsurface.  The buried item is located at the apex of the anomaly and the tails or extensions 
of the hyperbola are artifacts of the wide angle of the transmitted beam.  In addition, above the 
hyperbolic anomaly it may be possible to discern the soil disturbance (see arrow at top of page 
above G3 in Figure 20).  The control hole in the grid (G3) was important to show that the 
disturbed soil in the hole was not producing the hyperbolic anomaly.   
When the GPR imagery is compared between the 500-MHz (Figure 20) and 800-MHz 
antenna (Figure 21) for row 3 at 60-65cm, there are obvious detection differences.  Overall, the 
hyperbolic anomalies were clearly demarcated on the imagery for the 500-MHz (Figure 20).    
Conversely, the hyperbolic anomalies were poorly demarcated on the imagery for the 800-MHz 




f 60-65cm Figure 20: GPR radargram using 500-MHz antenna of row 3 taken at a depth o
showing hyperbolic anomalies  
 
Figure 21: GPR radargram using 800-MHz antenna of row 3 taken at a depth of 60-65cm 
showing hyperbolic anomalies 
 
With the incorporation of the Z-slices from the 3-D model, additional data were provided.  
Two Z-slices were found to be useful for analysis.  The first Z-slice was a cut through the 3-D 
model near the ground surface.  The second Z-slice was a deeper cut through the 3-D model at 
the depth of hyperbolic anomalies.  The top Z-slice of the 500-MHz data (Figure 22) clearly 
detected the disturbed soil of the top portion of all holes that were dug within the grid including 
the control hole (G3).  When comparing the Z-slices of the 500-MHz data (Figure 22) with those 
of the 800-MHz data (Figure 24) there was much better demarcation of the disturbed soil of the 
burial holes with the 500-MHz data.  Overall, there was poor detection of the burial holes using 
the 800-MHz data compared to the 500-MHz data.  Furthermore, when the deeper 500 MHz Z-
slice (Figure 23) was compared to the corresponding Z-slice of the 800-MHz data (Figure 25), 
the 500-MHz data once again provided increased demarcation of the weapons.  For example, all 
of the buried weapons were detected on the deeper Z-slice.  The circles and linear lines most 





were no weapons detected when viewing the Z-slice for the 800-MHz (Figure 25). Table 8 shows 
the differences between the 500MHz and the 800 MHz antennae with each viewing option. 
Therefore, discussion will focus solely on the comparison between the conductivity meter using 
transects of 25cm and the GPR using the 500MHz antenna. 
 
Table 8: Comparison of each viewing option with different antennae at a depth of 60-65cm 
 500 MHz 800 MHz 
Radargrams Clearly-demarcated hyperbolas Poorly-demarcated hyperbolas 
Z-slice surface Excellent detection of soil disruption Poor detection of soil disruption 
Z-slice deep Excellent detection of weapons No weapon detection 
 
The next and most comprehensive level of GPR data analysis is to construct a fence 
diagram, which is a composite image of a Z-slice and a Y-slice.  The fence diagram was useful to 
show how the detected soil disturbance on the top Z-slice corresponded with the hyperbolic 
anomaly of the radargram.  For example, Figure 26 is a fence diagram of row 5 using the 500-
MHz antenna.  The particular Y-slice through the 3-D model shows four hyperbolic anomalies 
from a number of large firearms and weapons (F5, E5, D5 and C5).  The Y-slice is oriented 
through the Z-slice to show how the four hyperbolic anomalies were located directly below the 
disturbed soil.    
 
 
Figure 22: GPR Z-slice using 500-MHz antenna when the weapons were buried at a depth of 60-









Figure 23: GPR Z-slice using 500-MHz antenna when the burial depth of the weapons was at 




Figure 24: GPR Z-slice using 800-MHz antenna taken when the weapons were buried at a depth 








Figure 25: GPR Z-slice using the 800-MHz antenna when the burial depth of the weapons was at 










Figure 26: Fence diagram of row 5 using the 500-MHz antenna that was collected when the 
 
Comparison among GPR Transect Intervals  
 The GPR data were analyzed using three different transect intervals. First, data were 
collected at each depth using transect intervals of 10cm (Figure 16) to ensure that every 
metallic item would be detected by the overlapping of the radar beam between adjacent 
transects. Next, GPR maps were made using 20cm and 30cm transect intervals by removing 
the additional transect lines that were collected every 10cm. Two depths were chosen to 
make direct comparisons among the transect intervals because the two depths were the best 
depths to make comparisons between the GPR and the conductivity meter data (see next 
  




but only a weak response was noted if the exact 
loca
section). The first depth chosen was 60-65cm because this was the last depth at which 
multiple weapons were producing strong anomalies with the conductivity data. The second 
depth chosen was 70-75 because this was the last depth at which the conductivity meter 
detected buried weapons. Data were analyzed by creating a 3-D cube representation of all the 
Z-slices together that provided visualization of the hyperbolic anomalies for the target 
depths.  Because there were slight differences among the weapons’ depths and the sizes of 
the weapons varied, the anomalies could not be all detected on a single Z-slice. Rather, the 
analysis consisted of scrolling through detected depths of the 3-D cube. Anomalies were 
classified as being strong, weak, or undetected. Strong anomalies were noted without 
knowing the exact locations of the weapons because a strong response was clearly 
discernable, weak anomalies were noted 
tions of the weapons were known, while weapons classified as undetected could not be 
detected even with the known locations.   
Results showed that there were significant differences between each transect spacing 
(Tables 9-14). Looking at the firearm results, transect intervals of 10cm and 20cm showed 
strong anomalies for all firearms at a depth of 60-65cm. However, when using transects 
separated by 30cm, four firearms only were detected with weak anomalies. These weapons 
were the Glock [A5], the North American Arms [B1], the Jennings Bryco [B2], and the 
Lorcin L380 [B4]. At a depth of 70-75cm, several changes were also noted in firearm 
detection. Using transects of 10cm, 15 of the 16 firearms were detected with strong 
anomalies; the only weapon detected with a weak anomaly was the Glock [A5]. Fourteen of 
the 16 firearms were detected with strong anomalies using transect spacing of 20cm. The 
Jennings Bryco [B2] was detected with a weak anomaly while the Glock [A5] was not 
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], the North American Arms [B1], the 
rewdriver [F2], and 
detected. When using a transect spacing of 30cm, the GPR detected strong anomalies 
produced by 10 firearms. The Hi-Point Model C [A3
Lorcin L380 [B4], and the RG23 [C2] were detected with weak anomalies while the Glock 
[A5] and the Jennings Bryco [B2] were not detected. 
 Miscellaneous weapons also showed several changes in detection between the various 
transect spacing. At a depth of 60-65cm and using 10cm transects, the GPR detected nine of 
the ten weapons with strong anomalies. The only weapon that was classified as weak was the 
mallet [E4]. At a depth of 20cm, the GPR detected four weapons as strong, three as weak, 
and three were undetected. The scissors [E1], the machete [E5], the baton [F1], and the 
sword [F5] produced strong anomalies; the buck knife [E2], the screwdriver [F2], and the 
brass knuckles [F3] produced weak anomalies; while the prybar [E3], the mallet [E4], and the 
claw hammer [F4] were undetected. Using 30cm transects, the machete [E5], the baton [F1], 
and the sword [F5] produced strong anomalies; the scissors [E1], the buck knife [E2], the 
screwdriver [F2], and the brass knuckles [F3] produced weak anomalies; while the prybar 
[E3], the mallet [E4], and the claw hammer [F4] were undetected. At a depth of 70-75cm and 
using 10cm transects, the GPR detected six of the ten miscellaneous weapons with strong 
anomalies. The prybar [E3] and the brass knuckles [F3] were only detected by weak 
anomalies while the mallet [E4] and the claw hammer [F4] were undetected. Using 20cm 
transect spacing, only four weapons were classified as producing strong anomalies. The 
screwdriver [E3] and the brass knuckles [F3] were detected with weak anomalies while the 
buck knife [E2], the prybar [E3], the mallet [E4], and the claw hammer [F4] were undetected. 
Finally, using 30cm transects, only two weapons were detected with strong anomalies: the 
machete [E5] and the sword [F5]. The scissors [E1], the baton [F1], the sc
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r [D4] were now 
ndetected. Finally, there no differences between the 20cm and the 30cm transects for scrap 
etals. As expected, no anomaly was detected at the control hole location. 
 
 
the brass knuckles [F3] were classified as weak anomalies while the buck knife [E2], the 
prybar [E3], the mallet [E4], and the claw hammer [F4] were undetected. 
 The scrap metal sample also showed some slight differences when comparing the results 
from the three transect spacing. At a depth of 60-65cm and using 10cm transects, all six scrap 
metals were detected with strong anomalies. With 20cm transects, the solid aluminum pipe 
[D3] and the rebar [D4] produced weak anomalies while the others still produced strong 
anomalies. Using 30cm transects, the aluminum edging [C3], the copper tube [D1], and the 
rusty iron pipe [D2] produced strong anomalies while the solid iron pipe [C4], the solid 
aluminum pipe [D3], and the rebar [D4] produced weak anomalies. At a depth of 70-75 and 
using 10cm transects only the aluminum edging [C3], the copper tube [D1], and the rusty 
iron pipe [D2] were detected with strong anomalies while the solid iron pipe [C4], the solid 
aluminum pipe [D3], and the rebar [D4] produced weak anomalies. Using 20cm transects 









Table 9: Comparison between GPR and conductivity tran r firea tion at 60 cm 
Length 
GPR 10cm GPR 20cm GPR 30cm 
Conductivity 
Meter 





11.9 Strong Strong Strong X 
Raven Arms 
MP25 
12.3 Strong Strong Strong X 
Hi-Point Model C 
Strong 
Weak 
North 13.0 Strong Strong Weak X 
Jennings Bryco 





Remington 870 76. Strong Strong 
Ruger P89 20.3 Strong Strong Strong Weak 
*: Does not include wooden stock 
 
17.8 Strong Strong Strong X 
Smith & Wesson 
5906 
19.0 Strong Strong Strong 
Glock Model 19 
American 
18.7 Strong Strong Weak 
Arms 
59 
17.0 Strong Strong Weak X 
686 
23.5 Strong Strong Strong 
Lorcin L380 17.1 Strong Strong Weak X 
19.6 Strong Strong Strong X 
 & We
37 
16.7 Strong Strong Strong X 
RG23 
14.8 Strong Strong Strong X 
Mossberg 500A 106.7 Strong Strong Strong Strong 
Hunter 
71.1* Strong Strong Strong Weak 




 Table 10: Comparison between GPR and conductivity for m us wea
detection at 60-65cm  
M
Weapons 








 transects iscellaneo pon 
iscellaneous 
(cm) 




St g St g 
Sc r 
Brass Knuckles 11.6 Weak X 
Claw Hammer 35.0 Strong X X Weak 
Sword 81.0 Strong Strong Strong X 
 
Table 11: Comparison between GPR and conductivity








22.2 Strong Weak Weak X 
Prybar 32.2 
*
Strong X X X 
Mallet 38.4  Weak X X 
Machete 68.2 Strong Strong Strong 
Baton 25.7 Strong ron ron Weak 
rewdrive 26.2 Strong Weak Weak X 
Strong Weak 
*: Includes fiber glass handle 
 
 transects for scrap metal and control hole 
detection at 60-65cm 
Scrap Metals 
(cm) 
Alumi dging 53.0 Strong Strong Strong X num E
Solid Iron Pipe 48.0 Strong Strong Weak X 
Hollow Copper 
Tube 
68.5 Strong Strong Strong X 
Rusty Iron Pipe 
S  
Pipe 
47.7 Strong Weak Weak 
Rebar 66.5 Strong Weak Weak X 
ontrol Hole X X X X X 
57.0 Strong Strong Strong X 









Table 12: Comparison between GPR and conductivity  fi io
Firearms 
Length 
GPR 10cm GPR 20cm GPR 30cm 
Conductivity 
Meter 
transects for rearm detect n at 70-75cm 
(cm) 
Davis Derringer 11.9 Strong Strong Strong X 
D9 
Ra s 12.3 Strong Strong Strong X 
17.8 Strong Strong Weak X 
Smith sson 19.0 Strong Strong Strong X 
18.7 Weak X X X 
North ican 13.0 Strong Strong Weak X 
Jennings Bryco 17.0 Strong Weak X X 
Smith esson 23.5 Strong Strong Strong Weak 
Lorcin L380 17.1 Strong Strong Weak X 
19.6 Strong Strong Strong X 
Smith & Wesson 16.7 Strong Strong Strong X 
RG Industries 14.8 Strong Strong Weak X 
Mossberg 500A 106.7 Strong Strong Strong Weak 
Norinco AK 71.1* Strong Strong Strong Weak 
Remington 870 76.2 Strong Strong Strong Weak 
Ruger P89 20.3 Strong Strong Strong X 






Hi-Point Model C 
 & We
5906 












Table 13: Comparison between GPR and conductivity transects for miscellaneous weapon 













Scissors 20.0 Strong Strong Weak X 
Buck Knife 22.2 Strong X X X 
Prybar 32.2 Weak X X X 
Mallet 38.4* X X X X 
Machete 68.2 Strong Strong Strong X 
Baton 25.7 Strong Strong Weak Weak 
Screwdriver 26.2 Strong Weak Weak X 
Brass Knuckles 11.6 Weak Weak Weak X 
Claw Hammer 35.0 X X X X 
Sword 81.0 Strong Strong Strong X 
*: Includes fiber glass handle 
 
Table 14: Comparison between GPR and conductivity transects for scrap metal and control hole 
detection at 70-75cm 










Aluminum Edging 53.0 Strong Strong Strong X 
Solid Iron Pipe 48.0 Weak X X X 
Hollow Copper 
Tube 
68.5 Strong Strong Strong X 
Rusty Iron Pipe 57.0 Strong Strong Strong X 
Solid Aluminum 
Pipe 
47.7 Weak Weak Weak X 
Rebar 66.5 Weak X X X 







Comparison between GPR and Conductivity Meter 
Three GPR transect intervals (10cm, 20cm, and 30cm) were used to make direct 
comparisons with the conductivity meter data that was collected with 25cm transect intervals. 
Two depths, 60-65cm and 70-75cm, were chosen to compare results between the GPR and 
the conductivity meter data because they were the last depths at which conductivity detected 
weapons with strong anomalies and detected weapons with weak anomalies, respectively. 
For each depth and for each transect interval, data were analyzed by creating a 3-D cube 
representation of all the Z-slices together that provided visualization of the hyperbolic 
anomalies for the target depths.  Because there were slight differences among the weapons’ 
depths and the sizes of the weapons varied, the anomalies could not be all detected on a 
single Z-slice. Rather, the analysis consisted of scrolling through detected depths of the 3-D 
cube.  In order to make comparisons between the conductivity meter and the GPR, each 
metallic item was described as being detected with a strong or weak anomaly or undetected 
for the conductivity meter, and described as being detected or undetected for the GPR. The 
comparison showed the maximum depth of detection for each metallic item with the 
conductivity meter and the GPR at both 20cm and 30cm intervals.  
At a depth of 60-65cm, the conductivity meter was still detecting multiple weapons:   
four weapons were detected with strong anomalies while seven others were detected with 
weak anomalies. The Smith & Wesson 5906 [A4], the Smith and Wesson 686 [B3], the 
Mossberg [D5], and the Remington [G1] were the four firearms detected with strong 
anomalies. Three firearms, the Glock [A5], the Norinco [C5], and the Ruger [G2]; and four 
miscellaneous weapons, the mallet [E4], the machete [E5], the baton [F1], and the claw 
hammer [F4], were detected with weak anomalies. Z-slices created from the GPR show that 
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all 32 metallic items were detected by at a depth of 60-65cm using both 20cm and 30cm 
transect spacing.  
At a depth of 70-75cm, the conductivity meter detected five weapons, four firearms and 
one miscellaneous weapon, all producing weak anomalies. The weapons still detected were 
the Smith & Wesson 686 [B3], the Norinco [C5], the Mossberg [D5], the baton [F1], and the 
Remington [G1]. Using transects every 20cm, the GPR was able to detect all 32 items from 
the grid at this depth. However, when analyzing the z-slice created from the 30cm spacing, 
three weapons were not detected: the Glock [A5], the prybar [E3], and the mallet [E4]. The 
Glock’s frame is comprised in majority of polymer which does not reflect as well as metal. 
The prybar was not detected due to its position in the burial hole which significantly 
decreased its surface area. Finally, the mallet only contains a small portion of steel, the 
handle being made of plastic. 
In almost all cases, the GPR produced better results than the conductivity meter at a 
similar depth. At a depth of 60-65cm, the GPR detected strong anomalies for 31 weapons 
using 10cm transect, 24 weapons using 20cm transects, 18 weapons using 30cm transects, 
while the conductivity meter only produced four. At the same depth, no weapon was 
undetected by the GPR using 10cm transects, while three were undetected using 20cm and 
30cm transects. Conversely, 21 weapons were undetected by the conductivity meter. 
However, in the case of the mallet [E4] and the claw hammer [F4] the conductivity meter 
detected both weapons as weak anomalies while the GPR did not detect them when using 20 
and 30cm transects. 
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At a depth of 70-75cm, the GPR detected strong anomalies for 24 weapons using 10cm 
transect, 21 weapons using 20cm transects, 17 weapons using 30cm transects, while the 
conductivity meter did not produced strong anomalies. At the same depth, two weapons were 
undetected by the GPR using 10cm transects, seven were undetected using 20cm, and eight 
were undetected using 30cm transects. Conversely, 27 weapons were undetected by the 
conductivity meter. At this depth, all GPR results were better or equal to the results obtained 
by the conductivity meter. 
 
Discussion 
The various image options to present the GPR data provided multiple views to discern the 
forensic targets.  The control hole in the grid (G3) was important to show that the disturbed soil 
in the hole was not producing a hyperbolic anomaly.  The detection of the various weapons was 
discernable when using the radargrams or 2-D time slices as a hyperbolic anomaly that may 
contain a soil disturbance directly above the buried object.  An advantage of the radargram is that 
general depth information is provided which helps investigators know how deep they need to 
excavate or invasively test areas of interest.  With the incorporation of the Z-slices from the 3-D 
model, additional data are provided.  For example, the Z-slices near the ground surface detected 
the disturbed soil of the holes. Conversely, the disturbed soil at the top of the burial holes was 
never detected with the conductivity meter. In a number of instances a Z-slice slightly deeper 
than the depth of the weapon was able to discern the tails of the hyperbolic anomalies.  
Furthermore, the fence diagrams incorporated the visual data by showing that an object 
91 
 
(hyperbolic anomaly on the Y-slice) was buried directly below the soil disturbance on the Z-
slice. 
The research has shown that the 500-MHz antenna was a better option to use than the 
800-MHz antenna for weapons searches in this type of environment.  The 800-MHz highlighted 
too much of the subsurface resulting in difficulty discerning the actual forensic targets.  This 
research utilized transects spacing of 10cm which clearly highlighted both the small and large 
weapons.  However, a survey utilizing 10cm spacing takes a considerable amount of time to 
perform.  The survey performed for this research project generally took at least 3 hours of field 
work, not including setting up the grid.  For a real life scenario, it would not be feasible to collect 
transects with this spacing for a large search area if the forensic target was a small sized 
handgun; a magnetic locator or an all-metal detector would provide better options for small-sized 
weapons.    
Results showed there were a number of variables that affected the ability of the GPR and 
the conductivity meter to detect buried metallic items in a forensic setting. The transect interval 
seemed to have a great influence on the capacity of the GPR to detect buried metallic evidence. 
As the transect spacing was increased from 10cm to 20cm, from 60-65cm, eight weapons had a 
decrease (going from a strong anomaly to a weak anomaly or going from a weak anomaly to 
undetected) in the strength of the anomaly detected. From 20cm to 30cm, at a depth of 60-65cm, 
six weapons registered a decrease in the strength of the anomaly. For both increments, 
approximately a quarter of the weapons had a decrease in the strength of their anomalies. At a 
depth of 70-75cm, such a decrease was noted in six weapons from 10cm to 20cm, and in seven 
weapons from 20cm to 30cm. However, for each depth, the detection seen by the GPR using 
30cm transects was still superior to the results of the conductivity meter. At a depth of 60-65cm, 
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the 30cm GPR transects detected 18 weapons that produced a strong anomaly while three were 
undetected. Conversely, the conductivity meter detected four weapons that produced strong 
anomalies while 21 were undetected. At a depth of 70-75cm, the 30cm GPR transects detected 
15 items producing strong anomalies while eight items were undetected. Conversely, the 
conductivity meter did not detect any strong anomalies and 28 weapons were undetected. We can 
then conclude that the GPR is the preferred instrument for a forensic survey regardless of the 
transect spacing. However, the quality of the results will be directly correlated to the transect 
spacing: as transect spacing decreases, the quality of the results will increase. For small weapons, 
transect spacing of 10cm is highly recommended, but for larger weapons, transects of 20cm or 
30cm can provide quality results. 
The size of the weapon being searched for is also a factor that needs to be taken into 
consideration before performing a survey. Results showed that the size of the weapon does not 
influence the GPR readings. The smallest weapon in the sample, the Davis Derringer, produced a 
strong anomaly down to 70-75cm with 30cm transect spacing while the mallet was undetected at 
a depth of 60-65cm with 20cm transects. This can be explained by the fact that the mallet is 
comprised a fiber glass handle, and thus, only a small portion of the weapon is actually 
comprised of metal. Similarly, the prybar was also undetected at a depth of 60-65cm due to the 
fact that when positioned horizontally in the burial hole, the surface of the item facing up was 
very small. On the other hand, the conductivity meter was very dependent on the size of the 
weapons. Conductivity results showed that small weapons became undetected at shallow depths 
while the larger items were detected down to greater depths. Therefore, the GPR should be the 
instrument of choice when looking for a small weapon while the conductivity meter and the GPR 
are both good options for detecting larger weapons. 
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When using the conductivity meter, it may be important to consider the type of metal 
used. Conductivity results showed that items that were not made of iron or steel were detected at 
shallower depths. On the other hand, the GPR did not seem to be affected by the composition of 
the weapons. For example, the aluminum edging and the hollow copper tube were detected 
strongly while the solid iron pipe was undetected using the 30cm transects. It would then be 
preferable for a GPR to be used on a forensic search if the weapon being searched for is 
comprised of or contains parts comprised of aluminum, brass, copper, or zinc.   
  Another advantage of the GPR over the rest of the geophysical tools is depth of 
penetration. Maximum depths of detection for the GPR were not obtained for all the weapons. 
The last depth surveyed with the GPR was 70-75cm because this was the last depth at which the 
conductivity meter detected weapons. At 70-75cm, anomalies were clearly demarcated for 29 of 
the 32 weapons. The three weapons that did not produce an anomaly at 70-75cm had a maximum 
depth of detection at 60-65cm. Thus, the GPR proved to be a better geophysical tool to use when 
searching for weapons buried at a greater depths, regardless of the type of weapon due to the 
maximum depths of detection being greater than those obtained with the conductivity meter. At 
depths below 25-30cm, both instruments provide strong detection for almost all weapons, and 
either one will provide good results on a forensic search. Between depths of 30 and 75cm, the 
conductivity is best suited for detection of large handguns, shotguns, and rifles and provides 
results similar to the GPR. However, if a small handgun is buried between those depths, the GPR 
becomes the geophysical tool that will give the best chance of detection. 
The results thus evidenced the need to adapt the forensic search to the type of weapon 
being searched for. The size of the weapon, the burial depth of the weapon, and the transect 
intervals will have an effect on the ability of the conductivity meter and the GPR to detect these 
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weapons. It is important for law enforcement personnel to pick the best geophysical for the the 
weapon being searched for but also the best instrument for the environment where the search is 
conducted. Areas heavily forested areas or areas on an incline will make data processing and 
analysis difficult for the GPR, and therefore the conductivity meter would prove to be a better 
option. Conversely, if large metallic structures are around the search site, or if the area is covered 
by concrete or blacktop, then the GPR should be used.  
 
Conclusion 
 Controlled research is essential to determine to applicability of the conductivity meter 
and the GPR to real-life forensic searches. A number of comparisons concerning the applicability 
of these two geophysical instruments can be derived from this research. First, it is important to 
note that the control hole included in the grid showed evidence that the anomalies recorded by 
the conductivity meter and the GPR were the result of the buried metallic weapons and not the 
result of the disturbed soil. This study showed that the GPR is more useful than the conductivity 
meter due to its increased maximum depth of detection, its ability to detect small weapons, and 
the ability to detect all types of metal equally. However, it is important to note that the transect 
interval should be small enough so that the radar beam between two transect overlap to avoid 
losing weapons due to wide transect spacing. It is also important to note that certain 
environmental conditions may influence the ability of the GPR to properly detect buried 
evidence. In the right circumstances however, the conductivity meter can provide a good 





CHAPTER FOUR: SEARCH GUIDELINES AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Guidelines Prior to the Search 
This research has shown that there are a number of options available when trying to 
choose which geophysical tool to use on a forensic search based on the target in question. This 
study has shown that materials which comprised the weapons did not affect their detection using 
the GPR and the conductivity meter. Both instruments were able to detect all 32 weapons 
whether they were made from aluminum, brass, iron, or steel. However, the depths of detection 
for items made of or containing parts made of aluminum, brass, or zinc were slightly shallower 
than those from similar items made of iron or steel when using the conductivity meter. 
Conversely, metal composition was not a factor when using GPR. 
Second, the size and depth of the target must be considered.  Analysis of the GPR data 
showed that it can be used to detect weapons of various sizes down to depths beyond 75cm. The 
conductivity meter can be used in specific situations. For medium to small handguns, lengths of 
approximately 17.5cm or less, the conductivity can be used if the weapon being searched is 
believed to be 30cm or less below ground surface. If the weapon in question is a large handgun 
(> 17.5cm), a shotgun, or a rifle, then the conductivity can be used for a search if the weapon is 
buried below 75cm. 
Third, transect spacing needs to be chosen based on the needs of the forensic search. If 
the weapon being searched for is of small of medium size, then the conductivity meter should be 
used with a 25cm transect interval and the GPR should be used with a 10cm transect interval. 
However, if the weapon is large, especially if over 100cm, then transect spacing can be increased 
to 50cm which is half the length of the conductivity meter. It is important to use transect that will 
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minimize the chance of not detecting a weapon because transects were too widely spaced. The 
geophysical operator should decide the ideal spacing once the type of weapon being searched for 
is known. The ideal transect spacing for the weapon being searched for should take into 
consideration other variables such as the metal the weapon is comprised of, the size or surface 
area of the weapon being searched for, and the amount of metal contained within the weapon 
being searched for. 
Fourth, there are many site conditions to consider.  Water-saturated ground conditions 
present a problem for both instruments as water can affect the size of the anomaly being 
detected.  However, a little moisture in the ground can sometimes highlight the soil disturbance 
of the burial hole because increased moisture will be retained in the disturbed soil compared to 
the undisturbed soil.  If the target is in a wooded area or if the ground surface is not flat, GPR 
may not be the best option, but the conductivity meter can be used along with the all-metal 
detector and magnetic locator.  If a search is being conducted in a small backyard, many of the 
geophysical tools can be considered.  However, if there is a large metal fence or other relatively 
large metal features (e.g., swing set) in close proximity to the survey area, the investigator needs 
to know the location of these features with respect to the instrument so the effect can be taken 
into account during the interpretation.  The GPR is the primary option for weapons searches 
involving buried weapons that may be placed under a cement slab or blacktop.  For example, if a 
suspected weapon is buried under the cement slab of a house or garage, a GPR survey can be 
performed to highlight specific areas for limited invasive testing through the cement.  A 
conductivity meter can also be used for this type of search.  However, if there is any metal in the 
concrete, the metal may interfere with the anomaly created by the actual target. 
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     Fifth, the size of the search area must also be considered when planning the search.  If the 
search area is very large, such as many acres, the GPR or the conductivity meter would not be 
recommended. The conductivity meter and GPR are better suited for smaller search areas 
because the time-consuming tasks involved with data collection and data processing are not 
always conducive to the time constraints involved with a forensic search.   
Forensic professionals should start the search for a buried weapon by gathering all 
possible information regarding the suspected target including size, metal composition, and a 
possible burial depth.  All forensic personnel involved with using the geophysical search 
equipment must be trained prior to using the equipment in the field during an actual search.  
Also, if multiple metal detectors are used during a search, all of the detectors must be configured 
to the same settings to ensure the consistency of results.  If a weapon similar to the weapon in 
question is available prior to the search, geophysical testing of the weapon should be performed 
prior to the field survey by burying the weapon at 10cm intervals to determine the optimum 
instrument settings for that investigation.  If enough time has elapsed for the search area to have 
changed since the weapon in question was hidden or discarded, aerials of the search area from 
the burial period should be sought to help plan the search.  It is also important to note that 
preparations for the search should focus on either defining a manageable area to search or 
dividing up larger search areas and starting with the most likely area first.  In addition, if it is 
possible to have the underground utilities and pipes marked in the search area prior to the search, 




Guidelines During the Search 
In the field, a grid should be constructed over the search area with transects spacing 
depending on the type of weapon being searched and whether a GPR or a conductivity meter is 
used. There should be one operator per geophysical tool for the entire search, and it is a good 
idea to have someone assisting the geophysical operator so they can place flags or markers on the 
ground to indicate the location of the anomalies.  The assistant should follow the geophysical 
operator along the grid transects.  The geophysical operator must make sure that the transect 
spacing used will provide overlapping coverage between adjacent rows or transects in order to 
maximize chances of detection. Once the geophysical operator identifies an anomaly, the 
operator should discern the size and center of the anomaly based on the conductivity readings or 
the GPR’s visual display.  Once the center and size of the anomaly is determined, the assistant 
should place a flag or a plastic stake at the location of all anomalies (metal is not recommended 
as the detectors will hit on any metal in the search area) and designate the anomaly as either 
slight or strong.  Once the survey is completed, the operator needs to prioritize which anomalies 
to investigate further by excavating.  It may be possible for the operator to first rule out a number 
of anomalies based on the context of the site or buried utilities.  Producing a map of the site that 
indicates all of the features is invaluable at the data interpretation phase when prioritizing 
anomalies for investigation.      
  
Conclusions 
The controlled setting of this research allowed for consistent testing, providing dependable 
results which can be easily replicated by investigators during real-world search scenarios.  A 
number of issues to consider when choosing which geophysical tool to use include materials of 
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the target, depth of the target, size of the target, size of the search area, and site conditions.  
Clearly, these results show that when law enforcement is searching for a buried metallic weapon, 
there are a number of options to choose from.  If available, the GPR provides the best depth of 
detection as well as being able to detect all types of weapons. If the environment is not suited for 
the GPR (e.g. wooded areas or sharp inclines), a conductivity meter can provide good results for 
a forensic search. However, these instruments require that the geophysical operator have 
extensive training in order to properly operate these complex geophysical instruments. It is also 
important to note that in order to have the best results possible, law enforcement personnel 
should test the geophysical instruments in the environmental conditions present at the forensic 
scene, if possible. The results obtained in this research represent soils of Central Florida and 
different soils may produce different conductivity readings. Finally, when performing a search, a 
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APPENDIX A  




















Figure A-2. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 5-










Figure A-4. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 5-10cm 












Figure A-6. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 10-









Figure A-8. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 10-









Figure A-10. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 15-









Figure A-12. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 15-









Figure A-14. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 20-









Figure A-16. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 20-









Figure A-18. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 25-










Figure A-20. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 25-










Figure A-22. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 30-









Figure A-24. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 30-









Figure A-26. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 35-










Figure A-28. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 35-









Figure A-30. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 40-









Figure A-32. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 40-









Figure A-34. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 45-









Figure A-36. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 45-









Figure A-38. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 50-










Figure A-40. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 50-









Figure A-42. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 55-









Figure A-44. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 55-









Figure A-46. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 60-









Figure A-48. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 60-









Figure A-50. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 65-









Figure A-52. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 65-









Figure A-54. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 70-









Figure A-56. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 70-









Figure A-58. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 75-






























Figure A-60. Overlay of research grid on conductivity map with weapons buried between 75-
80cm and mapped with 50cm transects. 
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